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SYMPOSIUM DISCUSSION GROUP REPORT
PRIVACY AND IVHS: A DIVERSITY OF
VIEWPOINTS
Margaret M. Russellt
A. CONCERNS
Group members accorded a significant amount of attention to de-
fining the privacy issues potentially raised by Intelligent Vehicle-
Highway Systems (IVHS), and expressed widely divergent views on
the following initial questions as posed by the facilitator: Are the
problems identified by the symposium papers truly "privacy"
problems? Is "privacy" (in either a legal or lay sense) an accurate
term to describe the complex constellation of concerns raised by IVHS
technology?
At the end of the group's deliberations, the facilitator conducted a
straw poll on the following three propositions, as formulated by one of
the members of the group:
1. IVHS, as presently envisioned, does not present any serious
or realistic privacy concerns;
2. IVHS, as presently envisioned, presents serious privacy con-
cers, but these concerns can be addressed adequately through the
adoption of stringent safeguards which will evolve reasonably over
time;
3. IVHS, as presently envisioned, presents such serious privacy
concerns that there is substantial justification to halt current efforts
until these concerns can be addressed.
In true reflection of both the diversity of viewpoints in our group
and the ambivalence of individual members over the course of a two-
day symposium, the final vote tally was: one vote for proposition 1;
six + one half + one half votes for proposition 2; and two + one-half +
one-half votes for proposition 3!
To summarize some points of the arguments, at least one member
of the group perceived no privacy problems at all with IVHS as cur-
rently envisioned, because such systems simply involve the gathering
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of data about public comings and goings. According to his argument,
no one has a right not to be watched when engaged in public activities
in a public place (e.g., driving on an interstate highway),1 and there-
fore no privacy rights are being abridged by IVHS recordation of these
activities.
Other group members, those voting for proposition 3, strongly
believed that privacy concerns are inherent in the development of
IVHS. They were persuaded by Professor Reiman's use of the "Pa-
nopticon" metaphor to argue that otherwise innocuous random data-
gathering assumes an Orwellian and sinister aspect when it results in
the ready availability of an informational "composite" about a particu-
lar individual or individuals.
Still other members, supportive of proposition 2, took a "middle
ground" in seeking to define the overall problem; they saw nothing
intrinsically invasive in IVHS, but rather identified the potential for
abuse in how IVHS is used, by whom, and with what degree of
controls.
Many group members found several of the presenters' references
to literary metaphor and imagery (e.g., Professor Halpern's "traffic in
souls," Professor Weisberg's "legacy of Dr. Faustus") useful as part of
a conceptual framework for identifying some of the intangible effects
of IVHS on autonomy, dignity, and identity. While some members
argued that Orwellian fears are exaggerated, ill-founded, and vastly
premature, others responded that our collective societal commitment
to individual freedom requires us to consider the "worst case scenario"
in assessing the potential problems of iV-S.
Finally, group members articulated the following additional con-
cerns about IVHS: loss of personal safety; loss of personal autonomy;
harmful error in data-gathering; the selection of IVHS decisionmakers
(should they consist of both private and public sector policy makers?
How should they go about formulating standards and norms?).
B. SUGGESTIONS
Regardless of members' individual views of the scope of
problems arguably posed by IVHS, all agreed that adequate controls
must exist to regulate the compilation, retention and dissemination of
information. The group was sympathetic to Sheri Alpert's position
that some of the controls and protections envisioned below might be
explicitly incorporated into federal laws, analogous to what has been
1. The group used as an initial and quite simple example of such technology the installa-
tion of electronic beepers or tags on vehicles, enabling the vehicles' (and occupants') wherea-
bouts on public highways to be tracked.
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done in the Privacy Act of 1974 and the 1988 Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act.
1. Whenever possible, personal identifiers should be elimi-
nated. For example, in tracking vehicular movement, vehicle IDs or
computer-generated secret codes are preferable to personal IDs. There
should be stringent controls on the creation of such IDs and codes.
2. Most group members thought it essential that questions re-
garding the boundaries of informational access be decided explicitly
and carefully before the information is gathered. The group concluded
that the incidental and inadvertent gathering of surplus data should be
avoided; one member expressed the strong view that all such data (i.e.,
information non-essential to IVHS purposes) should be immediately
destroyed to ensure against dissemination and misuse.
3. Several members opined that the risks of invasion of privacy
posed by IVHS are so great that this technology should be restricted to
the compilation and retention of aggregated information rather than
individualized information.
4. Many members agreed that IVHS must incorporate notions
of appropriate notice and individualized consent before information is
gathered, even in an anonymous, aggregate fashion. Several members
stressed that "consent" must be defined to take into account disparities
in bargaining power between the data-gatherer and the individual.
5. Group members were divided on the topic of the dissemina-
tion of IVHS-gathered information for non-IVHS uses. Some thought
that such data should never be made available for non-IVHS purposes.
Others stated that it was unrealistic to keep such information, once
gathered, from law enforcement officials, but that officers should meet
a warrant requirement before obtaining it. Still others in the group
held the view that perhaps private entities should be able to purchase
IVHS-gathered information'for their own uses, subject to the require-
ments of (1) informed consent of the individual; and (2) an adequate
"audit trail" of requests for data. One member stated that especially
strict controls should be instituted to prevent insurance companies
from securing IVHS-gathered information.
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